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INTRODUCTION
Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry
about what purposive presidential inaction1 in enforcing2 statutory programs
means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within
a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”3 Concerns about the excessive use of this kind of
discretion to refrain from enforcement extend back to the constitutional
debates, as historically oriented scholarship has now shown.4 The Take Care
Clause appears to have been more or less an explicit effort to disclaim the
“dispensing” and “suspension” powers that the King of England claimed for
himself leading up to the Glorious Revolution.5 But the issue has become
more immediately relevant in the wake of several high-profile instances where
the Obama Administration announced prospective nonenforcement policies
on immigration, health care, and marijuana, among other things.6 Critics
1 By “purposive presidential inaction,” I mean a President’s or an agency’s intentional decision to
refrain from exercising enforcement authority granted to the Executive by Congress. I do not address
a separate, but related, problem involving Presidents’ signing statements or refusals to act on laws they
believe are unconstitutional. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000). Purposive executive
inaction, as used in this Article, refers only to the President’s or an agency’s refusal to enforce
constitutionally valid statutory programs.
2 I use “enforcing” in a broad sense. It is not restricted to enforcement of statutory
requirements against individuals (i.e., adjudication or prosecution); rather, it refers to following
through on statutory obligations. For instance, if the obligation is a deadline to promulgate rules or to
act on a nondiscretionary duty, I consider failure to adhere to that deadline to be “nonenforcement.”
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
4 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781,
796-803 (2013) (discussing the historical background of and the founding debates on executive power
and the President’s duty to enforce the law); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 724-30 (2014) (presenting evidence that “confirms that the executive
function has long been understood to entail some degree of discretion with respect to enforcement
of statutory prohibitions”).
5 See Price, supra note 4, at 731 (“[I]t seems unlikely that early executive officials would have
believed they held broad authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes.”).
6 See Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence,
and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184-1203 (2015) (providing background on immigration
nonenforcement in the Obama Administration); Price, supra note 4, at 759-61 (highlighting the
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deftly lay out several problems with this trend: it appears to be somewhat
inconsistent with the original intent of the Framers;7 it has been conducted
mostly covertly, with little in the way of transparency and accountability;8
and, perhaps worst of all, depending on one’s political priors, it entrenches a
reactive bias in policymaking,9 particularly when divided government and
legislative gridlock make it nearly impossible to develop new regulatory
programs the old-fashioned way through new legislation or even new
regulations.10 The issue is also now far more vexing, insofar as the ubiquity of
law and endemic budgetary crises make some degree of government inaction
both inevitable and desirable. Most agree that the President should have the
authority to decline to enforce the law in certain situations where equity or
resource constraints prevent full enforcement of the law.11 But instances of
policy-oriented nonenforcement—i.e., the purposive use of presidential
nonenforcement to accomplish policy changes that would not be possible
through the normal channels of legislation—are more controversial. Some
now argue that this kind of exercise of executive discretion is not the kind of
thing the Constitution permits or the kind of thing we ought to encourage as
a matter of good governance.12
This Article challenges those writing and practicing in the area of
presidential inaction to ask and answer a difficult question that inevitably
follows: What role can and should courts assume in addressing potentially
Department of Homeland Security’s nonenforcement of certain immigration laws); see also Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost & Simon Lazarus, Obama’s ACA Delays—Breaking the Law or Making It Work?, 370
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1970 (2014) (discussing the Obama Administration’s postponement of
implementation of certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act); Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State
Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 292-96
(2015) (explaining the Obama Administration’s decisions regarding nonenforcement of marijuana laws).
7 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 803 (describing the Founders’ intent to eliminate, or at
least limit, the President’s discretionary authority through the Take Care Clause); Price, supra note
4, at 731 (outlining the origins of the Take Care Clause, which suggest that early American thinking
revealed no executive authority to decline to enforce federal statutes).
8 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1101 (2013)
(proposing to reform presidential enforcement through heightened coordination and disclosure).
9 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1237-50 (2014) (examining the implications of presidential inaction, particularly
a bias in favor of small government).
10 See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1828-30 (2015) (discussing the ways that gridlock in the
legislative process leads to work-around practices in Congress and agencies).
11 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 785 (arguing that the President’s strict duty to enforce the
law “is ‘defeasible,’ and its nonperformance can be excused or justified in appropriate circumstances”).
12 See id. at 784 (“We argue that the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President
a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases.”); see also Love
& Garg, supra note 9, at 1203 (suggesting that engaging in unchecked inaction “results in a bias
toward smaller government that our conventional concept of checks and balances does not tolerate
and cannot counter”).
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unconstitutional presidential inaction? While there are of course some
constitutional problems that have been entrusted to the oversight of only the
political process,13 ordinarily, where there is a constitutional problem, courts
play at least some role in addressing it.14 However, those who have identified
policy-oriented presidential inaction as a problem have yet to offer any
workable judicial rule or standard to address that problem. Some have
articulated constitutional rules that could, in principle, be applied by the
courts,15 but, in practice, would wreak such havoc on the judiciary that even
their proponents recognize that they are unlikely to be seriously
implemented.16 Other scholars have urged political process reforms that
would serve to manage presidential power in these areas but steer far away
from any judicial remedy.17
There are two major problems with constitutional review of a President’s
compliance with the Take Care Clause, both of which are implicit in scholars’
reluctance to assign a role to the courts. First, such review would invite an
overwhelming number of complaints and would be subject to such difficult
line-drawing problems that courts would, in effect, be forced to make their
review either exceedingly lenient or exceedingly stringent simply to curb the
demand for review. Neither situation would be ideal, since Presidents
inevitably need to make highly contextual choices about priorities and
resource allocation, and they clearly can abuse that discretion at times. A rigid
rule would be either overinclusive or underinclusive, and a flexible standard
would be impossible to administer, given the prevalence of nonenforcement
decisions in the modern administrative state. Second, even if courts were able
to surmount these institutional capacity hurdles and find a suitable
constitutional rule or standard, they would still be unlikely to actually affect
executive nonenforcement discretion in any meaningful way. Presidents are
not typically constrained by courts or Congress in separation-of-powers
disputes because, in the particulars of administration, they possess far greater
expertise, nimbleness, and even accountability than the other branches. Since
Congress and the courts are aware of their own limitations in this regard, they
are inherently hesitant to intervene in anything remotely resembling core
executive tasks, such as decisions about when to enforce the law.18
13 See generally Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2011) (discussing and applying political process theory).
14 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
15 See infra Section I.A.
16 See infra Section I.A.
17 See infra Section I.B.
18 See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v.
Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
253, 255 (2003) (“Even in the face of modern translation difficulties, and despite the factual and
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Given these barriers to developing an appropriate judicial response on the
constitutional level, we would do well to avoid reinventing the wheel. In fact,
we can avoid it. As a practical matter, challenges to the exercise of
nonenforcement discretion are ordinarily posed as challenges to agency
inaction. The President may involve himself more in some agency decisions
than others, but ultimately, he can act only through agencies, which are in
turn subject to suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 Thus,
even disputes about nonenforcement going to the heart of the President’s
agenda are typically posed as, or are easily translatable into, an administrative
law problem rather than a constitutional law problem.20 As it turns out—and
as I will demonstrate in this Article—administrative law has not turned a
blind eye to the problems identified in this new wave of scholarship. Rather,
it has developed an elaborate, often quite nuanced, and ultimately effective
approach to dealing with the institutional problems associated with judicial
policing of executive nonenforcement. Courts, in reviewing agency inaction
under the APA, in effect “translate”21 constitutional values in particular cases
through a form of review that leaves them both far less vulnerable to an
unmanageable caseload and far more capable of competing with Presidents in
the most important cases. Jurisdictional safety valves—such as the requirement
of final agency action and doctrines of prudential standing—as well as
complexities of administrative law doctrine allow courts to be selective in
filtering out routine nonenforcement cases in ways not possible if they were

procedural limitations in the case itself, Marbury’s core message remains clear and powerful:
pursuant to constitutional or statutory commands, the executive has the obligation to act within the
law, and the courts have the duty to enforce the law. Yet, although the general principle that the
president is obligated to follow congressional commands has not seriously been called into question,
the courts have, nonetheless, not always fulfilled their duty to enforce that obligation.”); Peter L.
Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 983 (1997) (arguing that the “President
as lawmaker” is dangerous “precisely because he is omnicompetent, remote from effective check by
courts or even Congress”).
19 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012) (providing standards for the
promulgation and enforcement of regulations); id. § 702 (conferring a private right of action to
enforce federal rights against agencies).
20 Love and Garg appear to argue that, although administrative law scholars have long engaged
the question of “presidential policymaking through inaction,” none have ever dealt with the
“constitutional dimensions of the problem.” Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1210. This is hair-splitting:
in fact, the problems are virtually identical, and to the extent that there are unique “constitutional
dimensions” to the policy problem, it is not apparent what they are. When it comes to enforcement
of the constitutional norm, however, important differences do arise, and the choice to treat the
problem as constitutional or statutory requires serious attention. See infra Part III.
21 Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 84 (2010) (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1165 (1993)) (introducing the idea of “translation” in noting that procedural statutes like the APA
can “translate” the principles and values underlying separation of powers into a world where agencies
have increased authority).
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applying a freestanding constitutional analysis under the Take Care Clause.22
Allowing courts to selectively review presidential nonenforcement discretion
in turn enables them to carry more authority when they do intervene.23 In
short, an administrative law approach to the root problem of nonenforcement
is far better poised to actually make a difference.
This is not to say that an administrative law approach to the constitutional
problem is perfect. Much more work remains to hone the doctrine and bring
it into accord with the nascent constitutional values implicated in this
debate.24 But it is a start, and one that I argue carves out an attractive and
institutionally feasible method for courts seeking to navigate the middle ground
between the extremes of separation-of-powers formalism and open-ended
functional balancing. Recognizing how APA review of agency inaction works
to optimally reduce presidential nonenforcement discretion speaks to the
important ongoing debate about what to do with policy-oriented presidential
inaction. We need not settle on untested political process reforms—such as
encouraging presidential coordination and disclosure of nonenforcement
decisions, or nudging Congress to write more specific statutes25—which are
unlikely to take hold or to constrain the exercise of nonenforcement
discretion.26
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the burgeoning debate
around purposive presidential inaction, recounting the formal and functional
reasons that constitutional separation-of-powers scholars have come to doubt
the constitutionality and desirability of the practice. Part II articulates the
22
23
24

See infra subsection III.B.2.
See infra Part IV.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1662 (2004) (attempting to “place administrative law back inside the universe
of basic constitutional design and purpose” and noting that the “issue of agency inaction” in fact
“can be reconceived as consistent with other constitutional doctrines”). One unresolved problem
that deserves attention in this respect is the ongoing debate over whether naked political reasons for
agency action are sufficient to survive arbitrary and capricious review. See generally Kathryn A.
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009) (arguing
for a relaxation of arbitrary and capricious review under the APA to accept political reasons as
legitimate justifications for agency decisions). This Article does not deal with this issue. However,
after committing the APA approach to the problem of nonenforcement, it will be necessary to sort
out these kinds of open questions about the appropriate time for court intervention.
25 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1083-94 (proposing executive coordination reforms on the
grounds of efficiency and democratic accountability); Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1244-49
(proposing multiple means by which Congress could work around presidential inaction, including
by passing more specific laws).
26 Congress itself may not be up to the challenge and may have no interest in ensuring that
the enacting Congress’s intent is enforced. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2250-52 (2001) (discussing how the current Congress may have an interest in
promoting “lawlessness” in agencies, necessitating some role for the courts in controlling political
influence on the implementation of law in agencies).
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problem with this growing consensus: there has been too little attention paid
to the role that courts might have to play in addressing problematic uses of
presidential inaction. Most importantly, efforts to invigorate the Take Care
Clause have been too inattentive to the strains on judicial capacity that would
be posed by such a development. Part III offers an argument that the
administrative law of agency inaction is better suited to take on the difficult
questions surrounding nonenforcement. Such review could do the work that
blunter constitutional instruments and the political process cannot do alone,
all while insulating courts from strains on their institutional capacity. Finally,
Part IV reviews three important recent federal court decisions, each
demonstrating how courts are conducting APA review to translate
constitutional separation-of-powers values through a review framework that
better serves the courts in their efforts to police presidential inaction.
I. THE DEBATE OVER PRESIDENTIAL NONENFORCEMENT
DISCRETION
By all accounts, recent Presidents have made extensive use of
nonenforcement discretion to further their policy visions. President Obama’s
decisions to defer removal action for certain undocumented immigrants,27 not
to enforce rulemaking and compliance deadlines under the Affordable Care
Act,28 and not to enforce federal marijuana control laws in states where
marijuana is legalized29 all brought the practice to unprecedented public
exposure, with Republicans in Congress accusing the President of acting
above the law.30 In fact, though, President George W. Bush’s nonenforcement
27 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who
Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JYG-RAET]
(“I am now expanding . . . case-by-case use of deferred action for those adults who have been in this
country since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who
are otherwise not enforcement priorities . . . .”).
28 See Memorandum from Steven Larsen, Dir., Office of Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Insurance Standards Guidance Series—Information 1 (Dec.
9, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/guidancelimited-benefit-2nd-supp-bulletin-120910.pdf [https://perma.cc/B69F-7FM6] (discussing the
requirements for “waiver[s] for a limited benefit plan or ‘mini-med’ plan of the restrictions on the
imposition of annual limits on the dollar value of essential health benefits”).
29 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF5H-UAGP] (focusing marijuana-based
enforcement on certain policy priorities).
30 See generally Senator Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (2015) (critiquing President Obama’s use of discretionary authority).
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of certain environmental programs—most famously, the “Clear Skies
program”—amounts to the same basic strategic maneuver for deregulatory
purposes, as did intended deregulatory programs in antitrust and
environmental law during the Reagan Administration.31 As political scientists
have long understood and legal scholars have begun to recognize, Presidents
of all ideological stripes have enormous incentives to accomplish something
while they are in office.32 And, in an age of divided government, polarization,
and the inevitable gridlock that these conditions foretell, it is far easier for
Presidents to use nonenforcement discretion than it is to push new initiatives
through the veto-gated legislative process.33
But just because the tactic has long been employed by Presidents34 does
not mean that nonenforcement is constitutional or that it amounts to good
governance. The high-profile instances of purposive presidential inaction
during the Obama Administration have stoked an important debate among
constitutional separation-of-powers scholars, and that debate has produced a
rare consensus across formal and functional approaches35 that purposive
nonenforcement is problematic, if not illegal.

31 For discussion of the Reagan-era programs, see JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE
EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES chs. 4-5 (2012) and William E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial
Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 66-67 (1991), which discuss the
Administration’s adherence to a merger policy in which the government did not challenge
conglomerate or vertical transactions. For discussion of the George W. Bush programs on
deregulation, see generally Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 795 (2010), which examines deregulation through nonenforcement during the George W.
Bush Administration and argues that the practice diminishes the government’s accountability, and
Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 44 n.147
(2008), which highlights the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies initiative as an example of a
President instructing an agency not to enforce certain laws.
32 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A
Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 854 (1999) (highlighting the growth and importance of
presidential unilateral actions motivated by Presidents’ desires to have power and establish legacies
as strong and effective leaders).
33 See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1217 (suggesting that it is easier for a President to achieve
a goal through nonenforcement, which does not require the help of Congress or the courts).
34 See Cheh, supra note 18, at 253-55 (drawing thematic connections to Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where President Jefferson refused to perform the “ministerial” act of
completing an appointment commanded by the legislature for more or less political reasons).
35 See infra Sections I.A–B. For a discussion of the competing traditions of functionalism and
formalism, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86
VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000), which discusses the competing traditions and claims that the debate of
formalism versus functionalism is a distraction. For a helpful breakdown of how some scholarship
on the Take Care Clause and presidential nonenforcement discretion is more formalist and some is
more functionalist, see Mitchell J. Widener, The Presentment Clause Meets the Suspension Power: The
Affordable Care Act’s Long and Winding Road to Implementation, 24 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 123-27
(2015), which reviews various scholars’ solutions delineating the proper circumstances for when a
President should exercise discretion, which often fall along formalist–functionalist lines.
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A. Formalist Critiques
The formalist argument against purposive presidential inaction stems
from the plain text of the Take Care Clause as well as the history of its
drafting and early interpretation. As Professors Delahunty and Yoo argue, the
clause is “naturally read as an instruction or command to the President to put
the laws into effect, or at least to see that they are put into effect, ‘without
failure’ and ‘exactly.’”36 To be sure, the words “faithfully executed” do imply a
modicum of discretion insofar as discretion is needed to further the “[c]lause’s
core purpose of ensuring congressional supremacy.”37 But scholars now consider
the clause to establish a presumption that Presidents will dutifully follow
existing law, not make new law.38 This textual argument is strengthened by
consideration of the history of the clause. While this Article is not the place for
a detailed exegesis, it is now well understood that the Take Care Clause was
crafted by the Framers to explicitly reject the pre–Glorious Revolution English
tradition of executive suspending and dispensing of the law.39
This textualist and historical interpretation counsels for very serious
limitations on presidential nonenforcement discretion, but by itself it does
not end the debate about the specific form of limitations. Thus, while
Delahunty and Yoo argue for a flat rule that all “deliberate deviation[s]” from
a baseline duty to enforce all laws are unconstitutional,40 others have been
more measured in their response, acknowledging that the modern
administrative state often necessitates nonenforcement of the law. For
instance, Professor Price argues that the text and history of the clause require
dual constitutional presumptions: first, a presumption that “executive officials
lack inherent authority either to prospectively license statutory violations or
to categorically suspend enforcement of statutes for policy reasons”; and
second, a countervailing presumption that the exercise of particularized
36
37
38

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 799.
Price, supra note 4, at 698.
See id. at 688 (noting that the “take care duty implies a principle of legislative supremacy in
lawmaking,” as “the President’s duty is to ensure execution of Congress’s laws, not to make up the
law on his own”).
39 See id. at 691 (“In the seventeenth century . . . as intense religious and political controversies
during England’s civil wars unraveled traditions of deference to the monarch, royal suspensions and
dispensations became a source of acute conflict between Parliament and the Crown.”); see also The
Attorney Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op.
O.L.C. 55, 57-58 (1980) (stating that the seventeenth century dispute between Parliament and the
kings supports the proposition that the Framers did not mean to allow the Executive to disregard
statutes); LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9-11
(Stephen M. Sheppard, ed., 2014) (discussing the Take Care Clause and the limits on presidential
power); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 808 (discussing the Framers’ knowledge of “England’s
constitutional moment in 1689” and their understanding that “the Constitution’s grant of executive
power did not include dispension”).
40 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 785.
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discretion in individual cases is constitutional.41 Similarly, the White House
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), in its opinion on the legality of the
Administration’s deferred action programs on immigration, offered its own
principled interpretation of the boundaries of lawfulness. To the OLC,
deferred action for parents of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents was
lawful because it was within the Department of Homeland Security’s expertise
and was consistent with “congressional policy” to support “law-abiding parents
of lawfully present children who have substantial ties to the community.”42 But
for parents of child beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, the OLC concluded that congressional policy in favor of “family
unity” did not extend to “uniting persons who lack lawful status (or prospective
lawful status) in the United States with their families.”43
The OLC’s approach amounts to a purposivist or intentionalist standard
under which separation-of-powers problems are potentially presented when the
President’s nonenforcement undermines the relevant statute’s purpose, as when
President Obama’s deferred action program allegedly departed from the policy
behind the nation’s immigration statutes (i.e., preventing the separation of
people legally entitled to be in the United States from their families abroad).
The OLC’s approach appears to track Professors Manning and Goldsmith’s
concept of the “completion power,” which involves an implied, or inherent,
power in the office of the President to carry into execution “unfinished
statutory scheme[s],” but “does not permit the President to act contra legem.”44
B. Functionalist Critiques
Scholars have also approached the problem from a functionalist
perspective and drawn similar conclusions that the practice should be
curtailed or policed (though their prescriptions often differ substantially).
Many scholars accept the premise offered by Professors Posner and Vermeule
that we live in an era that demands some departure from the liberal legalist
fiction of a constrained executive agent doing the bidding of the lawmaking
41 Price, supra note 4, at 704. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently seemed
to adopt something close to this principle, though not on the constitutional level, finding that the
Obama Administration’s deferred action program on immigration was reviewable under the APA
where it amounted to “the affirmative act of conferring ‘lawful presence’ on a class of unlawfully
present aliens.” Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 757 (5th Cir. 2015).
42 The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully
Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C., at 31 (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-authprioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC9G-6HR2] [hereinafter DACA Authority].
43 Id. at 32.
44 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280,
2302, 2309 (2006); see also FISHER, supra note 39, at 68-73 (drawing distinctions between implied
and inherent powers).
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legislature,45 but nevertheless maintain that nonenforcement discretion
upsets a pragmatic or functional balance in our modern separation-of-powers
system. For instance, Jeffrey Love and Arpit Garg contend that “interbranch
competition” is structurally undermined by the ease with which a President
seeking to underenforce the law can implement his policy preferences,
compared with a President that must positively enact new statutory authority
to take action beyond what is authorized in the legal status quo.46 Recognizing
that if Presidents “could ignore the mandate to enforce, [they] would be able
to nullify statutes, an outcome wholly inconsistent with the separation of
powers and the Take Care Clause,” Professor Andrias nevertheless insists that
some departure from this formality is practically necessary, because of both
“longstanding conceptions of presidential power and the practical reality of
executive power.”47 As she notes, “[P]residential involvement in the enforcement
of statutes involves a considerable degree of law-shaping, if not lawmaking:
Political value judgments are inevitable given conflicting enforcement missions,
broad delegations, and scarce resources.”48 For Andrias, the challenge then
becomes finding ways to balance these competing pulls—something that she
asserts can be accomplished by building up the coordinating institutions
surrounding presidential enforcement control, thereby contributing to the
public visibility of decisions to enforce and not enforce and promoting political
process controls on this executive discretion.49
II. THE PROBLEM WITH JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
The varied approaches and perspectives briefly catalogued mask two
points of considerable consensus. First, most scholars engaged in the
contemporary debate over presidential nonenforcement discretion are
sensitive to the legal and practical problems associated with the practice. To
be sure, there could be other silent observers that see the practice as benign
or even laudable, but there is indeed some degree of consensus among the
vocal that something must be done to curtail the ability of Presidents to use
this tactic.50 Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that litigants have
45
46

POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 113-14.
See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1206 (arguing that checks and balances should limit
presidential policymaking through inaction).
47 Andrias, supra note 8, at 1114. Future Presidents could, of course, reverse course and begin
enforcing the law, and indeed there may be opportunities for third-party enforcement or civil liability,
all of which should temper any sense that statutes can be “nullified” by unilateral presidential action.
48 Id. at 1114-15.
49 See id. at 1115 (“Institutionalizing presidential enforcement would . . . make it easier for
Congress, the bureaucracy, and the public to evaluate and respond to presidential action.”).
50 See supra Sections I.A–B (discussing the breadth of criticism of presidential nonenforcement).
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begun to test the constitutional waters.51 But that litigation also points to the
second item of considerable consensus among scholars: that whatever
limitations exist on the practice of presidential nonenforcement discretion,
they are, and ought to be, “nonjudicial” in nature. That is, even for those who
are willing to articulate rules or standards for constitutional adjudication of a
Take Care Clause claim, those rules or standards are aspirational rather than
actionable. Delahunty, Yoo, and Price remain fairly quiet about the specific
mechanics of judicial review in their respective articles.52 Others engage the
question to some extent but ultimately dismiss a role for courts in vindicating
the Take Care Clause. Andrias assumes that courts could not play a major role
in policing presidential discretion because courts following Heckler v. Chaney
“typically stay out of controversies surrounding executive programmatic
decisions, including nonenforcement decisions.”53 It is this second item of
consensus—i.e., that courts do not, and will likely not, assume a role in
policing presidential inaction—that this Article challenges.
Why is it that scholars who all see presidential nonenforcement as
problematic and worthy of attention are nevertheless unwilling to assign a
meaningful constitutional role to the branch of government most traditionally
associated with resolving separation-of-powers disputes? This question is
especially pressing when scholars are willing to articulate constitutional limits;
after all, what could possibly justify courts in refraining from enforcing
constitutional norms that are at issue in cases properly before them? Although
the literature remains relatively silent on the reasons why the courts cannot play
a role in policing presidential inaction, I suggest that there are two major reasons.
First, some of the hesitancy to assign a role to the courts results from an
implicit understanding of the limits of judicial capacity. Courts have finite
capacity to hear and decide cases, and they are therefore likely to craft legal
doctrine in ways that protect them against excessive litigation. These incentives
to craft legal doctrine with an eye to the workload it creates are particularly
acute in areas of the law that Professor Andrew Coan calls “hybrid” domains,
51 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex.) (discussing, but ultimately
deferring judgment on, the plaintiffs’ Take Care Clause claim), aff ’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d
by an equally divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
52 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4; Price, supra note 4.
53 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1119. Heckler’s presumption is so sacrosanct to Professor Andrias
that she goes to great lengths to assure readers that her proposals to increase the transparency and
publicity of presidential nonenforcement decisions will not result in greater levels of judicial review.
See id. at 1119-23. Love and Garg are even less sanguine about any potential role for courts. They do
not even acknowledge the possibility of a judicially implementable constitutional rule or standard.
See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1249-50 (offering instead a canon of statutory interpretation that
would indirectly reinforce constitutional norms in statutory cases). Further, they outright dismiss
the APA approach, claiming that Heckler v. Chaney and its progeny effectively “narrowed the scope
of APA review to the point that judicial review of agency inaction is virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 1226.
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which are combinations of “high-volume” and “high-stakes” domains.54 These
are legal domains that concern problems that arise so frequently and that have
such importance to the government that the appellate courts (and particularly
the Supreme Court) feel compelled to review almost every claim. In such
domains, once a court becomes involved, its only workable doctrinal choice is
to adopt hard-edged rules that deter litigation and facilitate easy resolution.
Policy-oriented presidential inaction is clearly a hybrid domain.55 There are
literally hundreds, if not thousands, of nonenforcement decisions of one kind or
another made by executive officials and line agents every single day.56 If each of
these nonenforcement decisions is potentially a constitutional violation, then the
number of potential cases that could be brought in federal court is staggering.
One escape from this precarious situation is simply to take the issue out of the
courts’ hands in favor of process-based remedies, as some scholars have urged.57
Indeed, preserving a role for the courts in the face of this institutional reality
immediately creates problems. Professors Delahunty and Yoo ultimately argue
that almost every departure from perfect enforcement is a constitutional
violation,58 and it is not difficult to see why they might want to adopt this extreme
stance. Such a hard-edged rule ensures that, were courts to attempt to implement
it, they would not have to make difficult, resource-exhausting judgments on a
case-by-case basis. Yet, just as assuredly, it means that the courts will never adopt
it: such a blunt rule is hopelessly over- and under-inclusive in dealing with a
public administration and legal problem that oozes complexity.
Professor Price’s dueling presumptions run into slightly different
problems—those related to judicial capacity.59 They resemble a standard, and
as such, they face the problem of judicial capacity head on. Courts would have
54 Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422,
440-42 (2012).
55 Indeed, nonenforcement discretion fits a pattern when it comes to judicial constraints on
executive power, for as Coan and Nicholas Bullard suggest, the stakes are high enough in this area
that many categories of potential claims are hybrid, or at least high-volume, domains. Andrew Coan
& Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 775-76 (2016).
56 See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (2002) (discussing the different styles of
enforcement in regulatory law and the opportunity to exercise substantial discretion in day-to-day
work). For instance, the OLC estimated that there are “approximately 11.3 million undocumented
aliens in the country” but only enough resources to “remove fewer than 400,000 such aliens each
year.” DACA Authority, supra note 42, at 1.
57 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1121-22 (proposing an institutionalization process to channel
presidential power); Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1232 (outlining the processes that can provide
oversight and contain executive discretion).
58 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 784-85 (arguing that there is no general presidential
nonenforcement power and any deviation from the Take Care Clause is “presumptively forbidden”).
59 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The rebuttable presumptions are, again, that ad
hoc nonenforcement decisions are presumptively constitutional even where they are policy-based, but
prospective nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unconstitutional. Price, supra note 4, at 704.
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to entertain many defenses to the tune that even though a particular
nonenforcement decision fell into the presumptively unconstitutional
prospective variety, the presumption was rebuttable in that case for whatever
reason, and vice versa for claims regarding nonenforcement actions that were
presumptively constitutional. This would not be a problem if there were other
features of the doctrine that could effectively insulate courts as they went
about applying this standard; as it is, however, those insulating features do
not exist,60 and courts applying Price’s presumptions would be defenseless
against an onslaught of cases that would exhaust the entire capacity of the
judiciary. The result likely would be that courts would quickly abandon any
pretense of reviewing nonenforcement cases of all kinds, as only a rule of
deference could provide the certainty that could avert a caseload tsunami.61
Again, this probably explains why Price fails to consider in any depth the
probable mechanics of judicial implementation of his proposal.
That is not to say that Price is wrong to articulate the fuzzy constitutional
line he does. In fact, his intuition that presidential responsibility to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed” constrains Presidents primarily when
they make prospective policy decisions about whole swaths of cases and less
when they make particularized decisions for resource or equity reasons seems
far more reasonable than Delahunty and Yoo’s more extreme position that all
deviations from perfect enforcement are unconstitutional. Price’s attempt to
remind more rigid formalists of the virtues and inevitability of
nonenforcement in the modern administrative state is admirable. But Price’s
choice to capture this complexity with a standard means that his
constitutional test could never, as a practical matter, be implemented with any
rigor by the federal courts—something he basically acknowledges by citing
no modern cases in favor of the standard he articulates.62 There simply would
be too many cases that would require nuanced applications of the standard.
Second, we might be skeptical of courts’ ability to keep pace with
executive decisionmaking under any circumstances. Whatever constitutional
rule or standard courts would apply would ultimately require them to tread
on very sensitive ground with very little sense of the lay of the land. As Posner
and Vermeule argue, courts are at an inherent disadvantage compared to the
executive because they are backward-looking.63 Courts usually hear cases long
60 As discussed below, they would potentially exist to the extent that the claims were attached to
an APA claim, but not if they were brought as a freestanding constitutional claim. See infra Section III.B.
61 See Coan, supra note 54, at 446 (arguing that in “high-stakes, high-volume, and hybrid
domains,” one tool the court could use to limit litigation is a categorical rule of deference).
62 See Price, supra note 4, at 747 (noting that “[f]or their part, courts have characterized the
task of deciding whether or not to prosecute as a fundamentally executive function”).
63 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 52 (“A basic feature of judicial review . . . is that courts
rely upon the initiative of private parties to bring suits . . . . This means that there is always a time lag . . . .”).
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after the purported inaction occurred, at which point it is very difficult for
them to second-guess what the executive branch has done.64 These difficulties
would apply to the substantive policy judgments that the executive branch made,
as well as to threshold legal questions such as whether the nonenforcement was
really a prospective policy decision applying to a class of cases or just ad hoc
nonenforcement. Moreover, if a case is decided at the constitutional level, the
intrusiveness and binding nature of that decision would provide further reasons
for deference, as courts would not want to prospectively constrain executive
officials. Given these difficulties, courts would likely be extremely deferential
even if they were to find a doctrinal form that solved their other problems.
Perhaps these practical considerations constraining courts in exercising
constitutional oversight of nonenforcement discretion do not really amount
to a “problem.” After all, as leading theorists now understand, just because
the President is not constrained by the forms of legal liberalism does not
mean that he is a rogue actor. He still must compete for popular support and
will generally appeal to the median voter.65 Indeed, the President’s role as the
only nationally elected government official makes him the best possible
official to organize and implement a coherent policy agenda that reflects
larger democratic sentiment.66 But to accept that a powerful President is an
inevitable and desirable part of our modern public law framework is not to
say that the other branches should willingly abdicate checking the President
where they can. If there is a way for courts to discipline presidential
nonenforcement discretion without overwhelming their capacity, courts and
scholars should embrace that method.
III. THE SOLUTION: JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE APA
There is a better way for courts to vindicate the values underlying the
Take Care Clause without entering a separation-of-powers war of attrition
that they are likely to lose, and that way is already operating right under our
noses. In short, courts already engage in far more effective review of
purposive executive inaction under the administrative law of agency inaction
than they ever could under a free-floating constitutional rule or standard.
In this Part, I take a close look at the structure of the administrative law of
agency inaction under the APA. While Presidents are not technically constrained

64
65

Id.
See id. at 115 (noting that “[p]residents strive to maintain the popularity” and arguing that
this results in constraints on the Executive beyond the separation of powers).
66 See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2331-39 (discussing the President’s ability to consider the general
public in light of his democratic election).
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by the APA,67 virtually every presidential initiative, policy, or decision eventually
manifests itself in agency action that is constrained by the APA.68 It is at that
point that courts can play an important functional role in “translat[ing]”
separation-of-powers principles and values into meaningful constraints.69 Like
Price’s dueling presumptions—but to an even greater degree—the
arbitrariness review courts conduct under the APA supplies an attractive
standard that provides courts with the flexibility they need to make inherently
difficult judgments about why some inaction is problematic and some is not.
Unlike Price’s approach, and, indeed, unlike any freestanding constitutional
separation-of-powers claim, this contextualized arbitrariness standard is
protected from the judicial capacity problem by several layers of defenses.
APA review operates with greater functionality because the complexity,
uncertainty, and limited precedential value of review limit the incentives to
flood the courts with cases and make presidential reprisal less likely, thus
giving the courts more powers when they do intervene. This functionality
point is critical and is elaborated in much greater detail in subsection III.B.2.
All together, these three features give nuance and power to courts as they
selectively police purposive presidential inaction.
A. The Structure of APA Inaction Review and the Limited Domain of
Heckler v. Chaney
Before developing the argument for employing APA review, I must first
address caricatures of APA review of agency inaction that suggest that Heckler
v. Chaney bars most suits based on agency inaction. As mentioned before,
several participants in the debate about presidential nonenforcement cite to
Heckler v. Chaney in dismissing a role for courts.70
The APA provides for review of agency action “unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed,”71 and it likewise defines agency action to include a

67 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (holding that the President is not an agency
and thus is not constrained by the APA).
68 See infra Section III.B; see also Kagan, supra note 26, at 2350-51 (distinguishing Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), on the grounds that the statute in that instance specifically
committed the responsibility to the sole discretion of the President rather than to an agency). Of
course, I do not mean to suggest that the President’s policy goals will always be the same as his
agents’ goals; there will undoubtedly be “slack between the President’s wishes and the behavior of
his or her many agents because no front-end guidance can anticipate the precise details and
circumstances of every possible violation of the law.” Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential
Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 806 (2015).
69 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 84 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)).
70 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
71 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
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“failure to act.”72 This general equivalence of action and inaction73 is, however,
limited by two provisions in the APA: section 701(a)(1) precludes judicial
review where Congress specifically precludes judicial review,74 and section
701(a)(2) precludes judicial review where agency action (or agency inaction)
is “committed to agency discretion by law.”75 As many scholars and jurists have
noted, it is somewhat inconsistent that the APA precludes review of decisions
“committed to agency discretion by law” but then specifically provides for judicial
review of agency actions for “abuse of discretion.”76 Perhaps because of this
inconsistency, judges have developed an elaborate common law of
presumptions77—first a presumption of reviewability that can be overridden only
by clear congressional language precluding review,78 and then a countervailing
presumption of unreviewability in certain distinct classes of cases.79
Some accounts lump the entirety of agency inaction cases into this final
doctrinal bin,80 and indeed it is not inaccurate to say that it is more difficult to
challenge inaction under the APA than it is to challenge action, partly because of
the specter of Heckler v. Chaney and partly because courts sometimes avoid
interference with agency priority-setting and resource allocation.81 But the
literature on purposive presidential inaction prematurely considers inaction
review a dead letter.82 The reality is more complex.
72
73

Id. § 551(13).
See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and
Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461 (2008) (noting that there is “confusion about the proper
standard of review and the distinction between agency action and inaction”).
74 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2012).
75 Id. § 701(a)(2).
76 Id. § 706(2)(A).
77 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1050 (discussing the “presumption of reviewability that governs agency
action”). For an excellent recent treatment of this case law and a critique of the presumption of reviewability,
see generally Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014).
78 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
79 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
80 See Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 381-82 (2009)
(arguing that courts rarely act on agency inaction).
81 See Biber, supra note 31, at 16 (discussing “an explicit concern about interfering with how the
Executive Branch allocates its resources among various priorities”); see also Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC,
522 F.3d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting the strong presumption in inaction cases that an “agency need
not address all problems at once” and “may solve first those problems it prioritizes”). Love and Garg also
argue that, were courts to attempt to scale up their role, they would inevitably confront “prudential
concerns” that would “likely prevent review.” Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1226. These prudential concerns
include the fact that it is “difficult to define a ‘case’ of inaction that is suitable for review,” that “courts face
a series of line-drawing questions that make them particularly deferential to the executive on the merits,”
and that “judges are likely wary of granting a remedy that amounts to telling the executive how and when
to act.” Id. at 1227-28. As will become clear, I largely agree that these are difficult problems to surmount,
as much in the APA context as in a hypothetical constitutional context. In subsection III.B.2, I nevertheless
argue that the institution of review under the APA has adapted to allow courts to sidestep these problems
in a way that they are not able to in any hypothetical constitutional context.
82 See supra Sections I.A–B.
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1. Avoiding Heckler
Technically, Heckler covered only one particular species of inaction
claim—nonenforcement claims. In Heckler, a prisoner on death row had filed
a petition with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requesting that
the agency investigate whether the drugs used in lethal injection were “safe and
effective,” order manufacturers to include warnings against the off-label uses of
these drugs, and take a number of enforcement actions to deter off-label use.83
The Supreme Court emphasized the unique challenge for courts in monitoring
decisions of whether to enforce the law in particular cases.84
But these kinds of considerations do not weigh as heavily in other types
of inaction claims, including informal agency spending decisions, denials of
petitions for rulemaking or enforcement, incomplete rulemakings, agency
refusals to adjudicate in the face of congressional command, and refusals to
issue rules in response to congressional command.85 When it comes to cases
alleging inaction in the issuance of rules, for instance, courts arguably would
have an easier time conducting review, as the determination would then hinge
more on compliance with a statute rather than on fact-based considerations
about resource allocation.86 In fact, courts have been more willing to find
agency inaction reviewable for arbitrariness when plaintiffs are able to frame
the inaction not as ad hoc, discretionary nonenforcement, but as falling into
one of these other categories instead.87 Courts have routinely exercised review
over inaction claims outside the context of discretionary enforcement
inaction.88 To be sure, where courts review a failure to promulgate a rule or
adjudicate a class of cases, they typically apply a “highly deferential” species
of arbitrariness review.89 It is review nonetheless, and agencies must still
provide reasons sounding in the statute in order to support their choice.90
83
84
85

See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1606 (5th ed. 2010).
Id. at 1607.
See Biber, supra note 31, at 28-32 (reviewing the different types of agency actions and the
level of deference afforded).
86 See id. at 49-50 (explaining that “statutory supremacy concerns would trump concerns about
resource allocation” in judicial review for agency inaction).
87 See id. at 51 (showing that agency actions governed by “detailed statutory requirements” or
a “clear duty” receive lower levels of deference than informal decisions).
88 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007) (holding that the EPA acted arbitrarily
in refusing to act on a rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gases); Brown v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 46 F.3d 102, 110 (1st Cir. 1995) (indicating that the refusal to amend an agency rule is
reviewable under the arbitrary and capricious standard); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4-5
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing the Department of Agriculture’s refusal to initiate rulemaking procedures).
89 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders
Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
90 See id. at 532 (“The alternative basis for EPA’s decision—that even if it does have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time—rests on reasoning
divorced from the statutory text.”).
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Plaintiffs can therefore greatly increase their chances of review by
characterizing prospective nonenforcement decisions as affirmative rules or
policies, which is often quite easy to do.91 At some point, patterns of
nonenforcement start to resemble rules, particularly when a memorandum,
guidance document, or policy statement guides the exercise of nonenforcement
discretion and qualifies as final agency action.92 Therefore, courts can avoid
Heckler’s domain and subject the decision to arbitrariness review, as well as
any other kind of review generally available under the APA, including
procedural review.
In sum, Heckler is a limited precedent. As Professor Biber showed in the
most exhaustive effort to date on review of agency inaction, Heckler v. Chaney
is not “the basis for an exception to judicial review that might swallow all of
judicial review of agency decisions not to act. Instead, it is simply the result
of the principled application of judicial deference to resource allocation in a
relatively limited subset of cases of agency decisionmaking”93—i.e.,
particularized enforcement decisions in a context of statutory silence.
2. Overcoming Heckler
Even when it comes to cases that clearly fall into the “discretionary
nonenforcement decision” category, review is not entirely unavailable. Heckler
did not announce a hard-line rule, but in fact outlined several situations where
the presumption of unreviewability can be rebutted. First, as mentioned
before, if a mandate in a statute is couched in nondiscretionary terms, and is
paired with “law to apply”94 that can guide the courts in review, courts will
still be able to review nonenforcement decisions.95 Thus, “when push comes
to shove and there is a direct conflict between statutory language (such as a
deadline) and an agency claim that its resource allocation priorities are
different, courts have consistently chosen clear statutory language over the
91 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that under DAPA,
an individual is affirmatively given a “change in designation that confers eligibility for federal and
state benefits on a class of aliens who would not otherwise qualify,” thus “provid[ing] a focus for
judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985))).
92 See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging a real dispute about whether
the FDA had made “affirmative acts of approval rather than refusals to take enforcement action,”
but deciding the case on other grounds); see also Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d at 757-58 (holding
that a memorandum on immigration was an affirmative action rather than agency inaction).
93 Biber, supra note 31, at 38; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not
Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 160-61 (2014) (emphasizing the primacy of
resource allocation concerns in setting the stringency of review of agency inaction under the APA).
94 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971) (holding that
the existence of a statute necessarily implies a “law to apply” and therefore limits agency discretion).
95 See PIERCE, supra note 83, at 1607.
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agency claims of resource allocation discretion.”96 For example, in Dunlop v.
Bachowski, the Supreme Court sanctioned review of the Department of Labor’s
refusal to bring a civil action against a union under the Labor–Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act.97 The Heckler Court cited Bachowski for the
proposition that courts could, and should, review even nonenforcement cases
when it is clear that Congress intended to constrain agency discretion by
using language such as “shall” or “must.”98
More importantly, Heckler v. Chaney also created an agency nonenforcement
discretion limitation that scholars have now begun to call an “anti-abdication
principle.”99 According to the Court in Heckler, the facts of that case simply did
not involve a situation where the agency “‘consciously and expressly adopted a
general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.”100 In cases where the agency has completely disregarded a
statutory program through the announcement of enforcement guidelines101 or
96 Biber, supra note 31, at 38; see also id. at 17 (“A cursory examination of lower court case law
under § 706(1) makes clear that the analysis of whether an agency must act under § 706(1) often
turns on whether the courts have concluded that the case involves important resource allocation
issues.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162 (discussing the same basic trend in the case law
and dubbing it the “anti-circumvention principle”).
97 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (“In the absence of an express prohibition
in the [statute], the Secretary, therefore, bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong
presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his decision.”).
98 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833-34 (1985) (discussing how in Dunlop, the statutory
language, including the use of “shall,” removed prosecutorial discretion). For applications of this
principle, see, for example, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015), which reasons
that language in statutes that is “mandatory, not precatory” increases the reviewability of
enforcement of that regime. See also Friends of the Cowlitz v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 253
F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a “decision not to enforce may be reviewable if Congress
has provided clear legislative direction limiting an agency’s enforcement discretion, and the agency
nonetheless engages in a pattern of nonenforcement”), amended by 282 F.3d 609 (9th Cir. 2002);
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that Heckler’s
presumption of unreviewability was rebutted where there was “law to apply” that established
Congress’s intent to “circumscribe agency enforcement discretion”); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d
1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) decision to allow
construction of a road in a wilderness area—despite statutory language providing that the
Department “manage [Wilderness Study Areas] ‘in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of
such areas for preservation as wilderness’” and requiring the DOI to designate roadless areas in such
wilderness areas—was reviewable because the statute was couched as a command and provided
judicially manageable standards to permit review (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2012))), overruled on
other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
99 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162-63 (referring to the idea that “agencies may
not invoke their ability to allocate limited resources in such a way as to abdicate their statutory
responsibilities” as the “anti-abdication principle”).
100 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
101 See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NRC’s
final decision was not reviewable even though it had failed to take action on a “discrete, perceived
problem within its area of statutory responsibility”); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37
F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (declining to review an agency’s “context-bound non-enforcement
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through a pattern or practice of nonenforcement,102 review will potentially be
available despite the potential interference with agency resource allocation.
To be sure, judicial application of the “anti-abdication principle” is usually
used only in extreme cases, precisely because of these problems of judicial
administration.103 But the principle is a limit on Heckler’s domain nonetheless.
The point of reviewing these exceptions and the limits of Heckler in
subsection III.A.1 is to underscore that dismissive treatments of APA inaction
review overstate Heckler’s domain and unjustifiably throw up the white flag
with respect to judicial constraints on purposive presidential inaction. Heckler
is not some talismanic citation that forever forecloses review of inaction of
any kind.104 As this discussion shows, courts find ways to review agency
inaction, and those ways may provide an avenue for courts to translate
constitutional values through the APA. The much more important question
is whether courts’ involvement in this posture is likely to be effective and,
more precisely, whether such involvement would address the problems that
doom constitutional review.
B. The Functionality of APA Inaction Review
Having cleared a major doctrinal hurdle, and having seen that review is at
times available (and precisely when the unilateral deviation from intended
enforcement is most extreme and most prospective), we can begin to see that
APA review of agency inaction has several features that make it useful in checking
excessive or unwarranted instances of purposive presidential inaction. Some of
these features are inherent in the administrative process—overall, administrative
litigation promotes certain values, such as transparency and dialogue, which tend
to raise the costs of purposive presidential inaction. That is to say, such litigation
is one way to promote the very values that Andrias, Love, Garg, and others hope

pronouncement” but noting that review would be available where a “document announcing a
particular non-enforcement decision would actually lay out a general policy delineating the boundary
between enforcement and non-enforcement and purport to speak to a broad class of parties”).
102 See Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 170-71 (finding that the court did not have jurisdiction to review
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision not to enforce certain Atomic Energy Act provisions);
NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1987) (granting review where
plaintiffs claimed that HUD’s pattern of not administering programs failed to further the goals of the
Fair Housing Act); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (finding
review appropriate when the agency failed to take sufficient action to end segregation in public schools).
103 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162 (“Because of the difficulties in administering
the principle, it will usually amount to a judicially underenforced constraint, but it remains an
important backstop that judges may invoke in extreme cases.”).
104 See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 689, 740-57 (1990) (discussing how courts have in fact developed a common law of
unreviewability that belies any simple characterization of review as generally available or unavailable).
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to instill in the process through other means. Other features are only apparent
when put in contrast with constitutional review.
1. Inherent Virtues
When a President’s decision not to enforce the law leads an administrative
agency to make a concrete decision not to enforce the law in a particular case
or class of cases, the possibility of judicial review under the APA forces the
agency to explain its reasoning. This reason-giving norm is so embedded in
agency culture that the threat of litigation hardly has to be realistic to have
some effect. Agencies are likely to volunteer reasons for their actions. By
itself, this reason-giving culture can enhance the legitimacy of policymaking
by encouraging deliberation that may not naturally occur in cases of
presidential inaction,105 which is generally less visible to the public.106
Agencies can also in effect tie themselves to the mast: indeed, they can bind
themselves to reviewability by issuing rules or engaging in a “settled course
of adjudication” that essentially promises certain levels of nonenforcement in
certain domains of conduct.107 Any reason that agencies (and in turn, the
President) offer for nonenforcement would have to address any prior
commitments or previous policies. This constraint may help address the
asymmetry between the institutional checks on a proregulatory President
versus the checks on a deregulatory President. In effect, a President who
comes to office hoping to deregulate would face more difficulty to the extent
agencies bind themselves with rules or guidance documents that effectively
promise certain levels or kinds of enforcement. This built-up structure of
discretion-reducing rules works only to the extent that courts are willing to
hold agencies to their own rules and policies, and, in fact, courts do step in
frequently in these kinds of cases.108
Moreover, it is critical to note that agencies are capable of sending signals
through their reason-giving in ways that expose purely political maneuvers

105 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1426 (2013) (“The deliberative promise of the administrative state stems from the
fact that agency decisionmaking can be inclusive, knowledgeable, reasoned, and transformative.”).
106 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1093 (discussing the lack of transparency in presidential enforcement).
107 See, e.g., INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (“Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered
at the outset, if it announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of adjudication—a general
policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy
(as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as
‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion’ within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (alteration in original)).
108 See, e.g., Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing and vacating
action by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) where a single BIA member “clearly failed to
follow . . . regulations”).
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by a President.109 Because courts may tolerate thin reasoning but will balk at
purely political reasoning under existing administrative law doctrine,110 an
agency that feels it is being strong-armed to abandon its mission can itself
sound the alarm for courts by embedding record evidence that political
considerations were determinative or by failing to build an adequate record
to support the (in)action under arbitrariness review. In effect, agencies’
ability to signal to courts the cases most worthy of consideration for inaction
review makes agencies an important intermediary actor and a check on
purposive presidential inaction. The administration may be able to dictate
nonenforcement from on high, but its imperfect ability to control agencies in
their reason-giving activities, caused by all the standard principal–agent
challenges, will make it more difficult for a President to push through the
most extreme abdications of statutory programs. Of course, these functional
checks embedded in the administrative process work only if courts feel free
to review inaction claims—but as we have seen, they will often avoid or
overcome Heckler.111
Another indirect inherent virtue of the possibility of judicial review under
the APA is that it creates incentives for Congress to assume responsibility for
specifying the level of enforcement it desires. Under existing case law, it is
clear that mandatory language in statutes will ordinarily carry the day in court
even when resource allocation concerns are an issue.112 Although Congress
may not be entirely aware of how clear this line of cases is,113 and even though
109 See generally Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative
Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013) (arguing that career staff in agencies may
strategically disclose weaknesses in the positions that are imposed on them by political officials,
thereby enabling outside litigants to challenge agency action more effectively); cf. Matthew C.
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755
(2006) (arguing that the depth of the explanation offered by the agency in litigation is a signal that
informs the court how important the policy is to the agency).
110 See Watts, supra note 24, at 6-7 (discussing the ongoing debate in administrative law about
whether courts should consider naked political reasons to be sufficient to support agency action).
111 See supra Section III.A. The effectiveness of these checks also depends on an important and
somewhat unsettled question about whether review of inaction claims for arbitrariness (when it is
available) extends only to the stated reasons provided by the agency for declining to act, or whether
it also allows courts to examine the factual predicates underlying the inaction and determine for
themselves whether the agency is shirking its duties. If APA inaction review extends only to the
reasons agencies give, courts would have difficulty reading the subtext, and would therefore be less
effective in targeting cases.
112 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 195 (“[A]gencies must obey a more general
anti-circumvention principle. Although it is neither necessary nor sufficient, the word ‘shall’ is a good
indicator that agencies are constrained in their ability to defer decisions, certainly for lengthy periods
of time. In other cases, the statutory scheme will best be read to contain an implicit, but necessary and
unavoidable, command that agencies must make a determination one way or another . . . .”).
113 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 97 (2014) (discussing a survey of
legislators which concluded that members of the legislature were unaware of judicial opinions
concerning technical aspects of statutes, but were aware of “decisions on broad, policy-oriented
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Congress may ultimately still prefer to avoid mandatory language for political
reasons, the nearly guaranteed judicial review when Congress uses mandatory
language, such as “shall enforce” and the like, provides incentives for
Congress to be specific in legislation.114 In the end, it seems that APA inaction
review could very well augment the political process controls that scholars such
as Andrias, Love, and Garg advocate for, using newer, untested institutions and
processes.115 Thus, even if political process controls are the best way to
constrain purposive presidential inaction, there is still a good case to be made
that courts can reinforce these controls through the use of the APA.
Finally, because courts invalidating agency action or inaction will often
simply remand to the agency for further consideration,116 challenges based on
procedural violations or the arbitrary and capricious standard will often be
less intrusive to the executive branch than an invalidation of the same
behavior under a constitutional rule or standard. Agencies whose actions or
inactions are remanded can often return to the drawing board and re-emerge
having made the same substantive policy choices, albeit under different
justifications, evidence, and reasoning. This is not the case with constitutional
review, which casts much more of a pallor over an entire policy area when the
courts vacate the agency’s action.
The arbitrariness approach to the problem of nonenforcement of the law
is powerful because it is a flexible standard that gives courts, agencies,
Congress, and even the President the ability to work out context-specific
solutions to what is, at root, a thorny problem of public administration.
2. Comparative Virtues
My claim is not merely that review under the APA is preferable on its
own substantive merits to any other proposal currently on the table under the
Take Care Clause, but also that APA review has the built-in features necessary
issues of statutory interpretation”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 940-41 (2013) (conducting a survey of congressional staffers and finding a
variance in awareness and understanding of the different canons of statutory interpretation
employed by courts).
114 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (finding that when there is no express
statutory prohibition of judicial review, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend
to prohibit judicial review of an agency action).
115 See supra Section I.B.
116 See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for
Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 297 (2005) (surveying and assessing the D.C.
Circuit’s application of the remand without vacatur remedy); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea:
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 298-99 (2003)
(discussing why many courts have elected to remand unlawful agency rules for further consideration
without vacating that rule in the interim).
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to make such a flexible standard possible in the face of the judicial capacity
problem. That is, it is the only realistic approach to the constitutional problem
here. When compared with a freestanding constitutional cause of action,117 a
cause of action brought under the APA gives reviewing courts several
important “outs” that help preserve both institutional capacity and capital.
With respect to institutional capacity, my argument centers on the existence
of jurisdictional and doctrinal safety valves that enable courts to quickly and
easily filter out cases that do not raise substantial claims. With respect to
institutional capital, my argument relies on the legitimizing effects of reliance
on these “passive virtues” in a delicate separation-of-powers arena.118
a. Jurisdictional Safety Valves
If courts are going to impose any potent constraints on purposive
executive inaction, they need to have plenty of safety valves, and the
framework for litigation under the APA provides them in bulk. For instance,
117 In many cases, the APA would be the vehicle for any constitutional claim because the APA
provides a general cause of action for review of federal questions arising from agency action or
inaction. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). Yet that is not always the case, especially in the context of the
separation of powers. In a number of separation-of-powers cases, the cause of action for the
constitutional claim did not come from the APA, but rather was derived from a right to relief based
in the equitable power of courts to remedy violations of the “structural Constitution.” See, e.g., Kent
Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation,
92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 495-96 (2014) (“The Court has suggested (if not held) that regulated parties
have ‘implied private right[s] of action directly under the Constitution . . . under the Appointments
Clause or separation-of-powers principles’ . . . .”); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural
Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1443-45 (2013) (highlighting cases where individual litigants
brought equitable separation-of-powers claims on the grounds that legislation violated the
constitutional structure). For instance, in the recent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) case, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, dismissed the government’s contention that there
was no “implied private right of action directly under the Constitution to challenge governmental
action under the Appointments Clause or separation-of-powers principles.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010). In the recess appointments case, Noel
Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit found it had jurisdiction over an action to vindicate the structural
constitution where any statutory review was waived, and the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed that
approach. 705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff ’d, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). The court relied on the
fact that the questions at issue “go to the very power of the Board to act and implicate fundamental
separation of powers concerns.” Id. Finally, some rare cases may also be pled as Bivens actions for
damages stemming from constitutional violations, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and those cases would likewise not entail these
additional jurisdictional limitations. All of this is to say that any constitutional standard against
nonenforcement could, in theory, be brought as a freestanding constitutional cause of action rather
than tagged onto an APA claim. It follows that none of the specific benefits identified below would
attach to such cases.
118 See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 567
(2014) (describing “passive virtues” as tools used by courts to dispose of cases before reaching and
deciding on the merits). Of course, Professor Jacobs borrows the term “passive virtues” from
Alexander Bickel. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111 (1986).
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a potential litigant needs to not only make a prima facie case that judicial
review is not precluded under section 701(a)(1) or section 701(a)(2) of the
APA,119 but also must show that the action (or inaction) represents a “final”
agency action.120 Because this determination often turns on how a court
characterizes the stability of any nonenforcement decision, it is in practice
easy for courts to decide that an agency action is sufficiently provisional to
avoid jurisdiction. As a practical matter, it is far more difficult to establish
that an inaction is final than that an action is final, as agencies can simply
argue that they are saying “not now” rather than “not ever.”121 Thus, the
requirement of final agency action is an extremely useful filter,
notwithstanding the fact that the APA formally equates agency action and
inaction.122 Another important safety valve that applies in the administrative
law context is prudential standing.123 Establishing that a general member of
the public suffering from some nonenforcement of the law against a third
party is within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by the statute
is a substantial burden because “increasing the regulatory burden on others”
is not sufficient.124 Courts can easily avoid reviewing most cases by using any
of these safety valves, which preserves their institutional capacity to handle
the most important inaction cases, not to mention all of the other matters
that federal courts must attend to.
In an area where there are very legitimate concerns about judicial review
for the strain it can impose on agencies as they make important resource
allocation decisions, a kind of judicial review that allows courts to pick and
choose their battles is really the only kind of judicial review that could work.
Structural constitutional litigation, in contrast, does not require anything like
a “final” agency action and relaxes the requirement that plaintiffs need to be
the intended beneficiaries of a statutory program. Provided a plaintiff could
119
120

See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 238-41 (1980) (elaborating on a
flexible, “pragmatic” approach to determining whether agency action is final); Belle Co. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that finality of agency action
requires the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and the action to be one with
“legal consequences”), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2427 (2016) (mem.). The suit must also satisfy the closely
related issue of whether the controversy is “ripe” for judgment. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d
1405, 1417-19 (10th Cir. 1990) (using the two-pronged test—fitness for judicial resolution and
hardship to parties—to determine if an issue was ripe for adjudication).
121 See generally Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93 (discussing the legality of agency deferrals
and the potential consequences).
122 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
123 See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987) (requiring that, for the plaintiff to
have standing, the “interest sought to be protected by the complainant” fall “within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))).
124 Delta Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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establish constitutional standing and could clear relatively low federal
question jurisdiction hurdles, federal courts would inevitably be drawn into
the merits in cases alleging even the most insignificant nonenforcement
decisions. Courts would have difficulty maintaining any kind of stringency of
review with so few defenses at their disposal.125
b. Doctrinal Safety Valves
In addition to the jurisdictional safety valves, the doctrine of APA review
of agency inaction itself contains built-in mechanisms that allow courts to
selectively apply more or less stringent arbitrariness review, depending on
how the factual context is characterized.
i. The Artificial Action/Inaction Distinction
Although Section III.A took issue with those who dismiss the potency of
APA inaction review, there is clearly an important difference in the stringency
of review between cases involving inaction and cases involving action.
Despite the fact that this distinction is somewhat metaphysical and in fact
runs up against the language of the APA,126 the diverging treatments of these
two doctrinal categories afford courts a useful tool. How a case is framed can
make all of the difference. If courts want to increase the stringency of review,
they may be able to characterize the inaction at issue as stemming from a
conscious policy choice that functions more as an action than as an instance
of inaction.
To some extent, Professor Price’s dueling presumptions127 can do the same
work as the inaction doctrine under the APA: a court can pivot between
characterizing an instance of inaction as a “prospective” decision that looks more
like a policy or rule of general application and characterizing it as a one-off
enforcement decision based on contextual factors such as resource constraints or
equity. It can thereby selectively apply more stringent review when warranted
and less stringent review when appropriate. The problem with Price’s approach
is that his category of “prospective” decisions is still too large. Too many cases
could plausibly fit into his presumption against the constitutionality of
prospective decisions. In contrast, the distinction between action and inaction in
the APA context is conceptualized more as a continuum, giving the courts even
more flexibility. Price’s approach is not so much wrong as it is too rigid.
125 Perhaps courts would develop a Heckler-esque framework in the constitutional setting.
Setting aside the fact that courts would have no clear authority to develop an elaborate constitutional
common law of reviewability, it still would beg the question of why the courts would want to reverse
engineer constitutional review to get what they already have under the APA.
126 See supra Section III.A.
127 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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ii. The Flexibility of Arbitrariness Review
Perhaps the best arrow in the judiciary’s quiver is the sliding scale of
deference, which oscillates between extreme deference and “hard look” review
depending on the circumstances. Once procedural hurdles are cleared and
cases of inaction become reviewable, the substantive standards governing
review provide for flexibility in the stringency of review based on the
importance of resource allocation in that class of decisions.128 Legal doctrine
under the APA indicates that one-off enforcement decisions (the kind that are
a dime a dozen in the administrative state) are presumptively unreviewable
because they implicate delicate resource allocation decisions, but as the agency
inaction at issue becomes more generally applicable (and therefore more
important), the deference afforded in practice declines to reflect the relatively
lower burden on resource allocation that would likely be imposed.129
Of course, variation in the stringency of arbitrariness review is not
necessarily unique to the inaction context. Empirical scholarship shows that
arbitrariness review is at least partly driven by extralegal factors, such as the
partisanship of the judge.130 But the relative importance of resource allocation
in the context of agency inaction introduces another variable that, in practice,
allows courts to exercise exceedingly lenient review in the vast majority of
cases, but to ramp up that review in precisely those cases where the gravest
constitutional concerns are at play (i.e., prospective nonenforcement
decisions). Indeed, the case law is consistent with courts stepping in and
heightening the stringency of review in the most important cases.131 The
Supreme Court rarely entertains inaction cases (even those where the lower
court exercised review), and when it does enter the fray, as in Massachusetts v.
EPA or in Mach Mining v. EEOC, it typically sides against agencies’ claims of
categorical deference.132
Professor Vermeule argues that jurisprudential structures called “grey
holes”133 are pervasive in administrative law. Grey holes are doctrines that

128 See Biber, supra note 31, at 51 tbl.1 (illustrating the sliding scale of judicial deference given
to different types of agency action depending on the agency’s resource allocation).
129 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527, 534 (2007) (acknowledging that an agency has
broad discretion in allocating resources, but concluding that in certain situations the courts can still
find certain agency inaction arbitrary and capricious).
130 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 761, 767-68 (2008) (discussing the results of a statistical analysis of voting patterns in
arbitrariness cases and finding pervasive partisan effects).
131 See infra Part IV.
132 See infra Part IV.
133 See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096
(2009) (“Grey holes . . . arise when ‘there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases.’” (quoting
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appear to provide legal standards for the judicial resolution of cases, but in
practice break down in important cases.134 Typically, these grey holes augment
the power of the President in emergency contexts in which the courts lack the
capacity to engage the President.135 Here we have what might be called a
“reverse grey hole”—one that diminishes the authority of the sovereign (the
President) in the “exceptional” case. The presumption of unreviewability sets
the default rule,136 but the increasingly stringent review as cases become more
prospective, more important, and less likely to seriously interfere with
delicate resource allocation decisions allows courts to involve themselves in
the merits of the most important inaction cases137—precisely the ones that,
because of their salience and policy importance, are most likely to raise
constitutional concerns about the separation of powers. Indeed, in the wake
of Massachusetts v. EPA, some commentators noted the fact that the Court
simultaneously claimed to apply a highly deferential standard of review but
actually conducted an extraordinarily probing form of review.138 These
commentators typically dismissed the importance of the case, chalking the
result up to the policy salience of the case.139 But that is precisely why we
should not dismiss cases like Massachusetts v. EPA: it is the fact that such
stringent review is exceptional that gives the courts the power to influence
the balance of powers.
IV. DEMONSTRATING THE POWER OF THE APA APPROACH
So far, I have shown that, despite considerable anxiety about what policyoriented presidential inaction means for the separation of powers and the rule
of law, scholars have looked away from the courts for a remedy. This reluctance
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 42
(2006))).
134 See id. (“Grey holes thus present ‘the facade or form of the rule of law rather than any
substantive protections.’” (quoting DYZENHAUS, supra note 133, at 3)).
135 See id. at 1118 (“[Q]uite ordinary administrative law doctrines, such as ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ review of agency policy choices and factual findings, function as grey holes during times
of war and real or perceived emergency.”); see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 96-101
(giving an overview of the effect of “grey holes” on judicial review).
136 See Biber, supra note 31, at 10 (noting the Heckler decision’s role in creating a potential
exception to the presumption of reviewability for agency inaction).
137 See id. at 52 (establishing the premise that agency inaction is reviewable and judicial scrutiny
adjusts with agency resource allocation).
138 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New
Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1040-42 (2008) (detailing the
Supreme Court’s rigorous review in Massachusetts v. EPA of the EPA’s policy reasons for not
regulating greenhouse gases and noting the dissonance with precedent of a more deferential review).
139 See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (arguing that the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA is illustrative of a broader theme
of politicization of administrative expertise and the Court’s attempt to monitor that trend).
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to assign the judiciary a role stems, I argue, from a generally correct intuition
that the courts are institutionally ill-equipped to serve as a meaningful check
on the President because of the nature and characteristics of the judicial
branch.140 But I have just shown in the preceding Part that the administrative
law of agency inaction has features that make it an exception to this basic rule.
As such, judicial review under the APA can and does provide the meaningful
assurance against presidential overreach that has so far been missing from the
largely theoretical debates on the issue. In sum, I self-consciously make a sort
of Goldilocks argument: APA inaction review is well positioned to address
purposive presidential inaction because its jurisdictional and doctrinal safety
valves allow courts to avoid becoming too involved in most cases of individual
inaction, freeing up the courts to implement a flexible style of review in
precisely those cases that involve the greatest overreach or abdication by the
executive branch—i.e., where inaction is being used in a sweeping or
formalized manner to achieve larger policy aims that depart from statutory
requirements. In other words, the “ideal” judicial enforcement is
presumptively lax but at times capable of showing teeth. APA review provides
that “just right” amount of oversight.
In order to show how APA review is “just right,” it is perhaps helpful to
examine a few illustrative cases where the courts have asserted themselves in
measured ways. The cases I discuss in this Part show courts not only wading
deep into potential interbranch conflicts over presidential inaction, but also
triggering a relatively muted response and little contest from the White
House. One could attempt to explain away these cases by asserting that
Presidents Bush and Obama did not really care about the outcomes in these
cases, but that explanation would directly conflict with the evidence. These
cases touch upon what were—and still are—hot-button, salient policy
questions. By all indications, the President simply appears to have been
constrained in each case. One could likewise attempt to explain away these
cases by essentially arguing that they are somewhat exceptional. Indeed, they
are. That is precisely what gave the cases their power.
A. Massachusetts v. EPA
One of the most dramatic instances of judicial involvement in purposive
presidential inaction came in a challenge to the EPA’s refusal to regulate
motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean
Air Act. In 2007, the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s rejection of a
140 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 52-53 (looking at features of the courts, like
having to wait for a case or controversy, that make it hard for them to regulate the President); see
also Coan, supra note 54 (taking an intense look at how structural organization creates constraints on
the development of substantive doctrine).

2016]

The Virtues of an APA Approach

1941

petition for rulemaking asking the agency to promulgate an emissions rule
was arbitrary and contrary to law.141 In doing so, the Court rejected the EPA’s
(and presumably the Bush Administration’s) more pragmatic reasons for not
granting the petition.142 Instead, it insisted that if the agency were to decline
to act, “its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing
statute.”143 That is to say, the EPA would have to make a scientific judgment
about whether carbon dioxide emissions “cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”144
The decision received a great deal of attention in the media, primarily for
its implications for the policy debates over the United States’ response to the
threat of global climate change, and it has paved the way for an extensive
effort by the EPA—with the active support of President Obama—to address
climate change under the Clean Air Act. What is surprising, though, is (1) how
infrequently the media and political response to the decision has been framed
as a possible judicial affront to presidential responsibilities, and (2) how muted
President Bush’s response was to an apparent limitation on his authority.
On the first point, the Supreme Court seemed to anticipate that many
would criticize the Court for overstepping its institutional role, stating, “To
the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of
the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design.”145 Either
that simple nod to Congress was entirely convincing or there simply was no
real concern among relevant political actors or the media about the obvious
separation-of-powers concerns at issue in the case, because there were few
complaints couched in those terms. The opinion was a major policy loss for
the President. Early in his presidency, George W. Bush had built a significant
amount of his policy agenda around appeasing energy and automobile
industries and assuring them that he was in no rush to address climate change.
One would think, then, that the President, not being constrained by the threat
of judicial review, would resist the Supreme Court’s directions in Massachusetts
v. EPA. But that is not at all what happened. Almost immediately, Bush issued
Executive Order 13,432 calling on agencies to cooperate to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from mobile sources,146 and then began preparing formal
judgments that not only provided a reasoned decision based on statutory
141
142

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
The EPA had argued that it was declining to act because other agencies were already
effectively tackling the risks of carbon emissions, because an agency rule could interfere with the
President’s ability to negotiate climate agreements with other nations, and because an approach
targeting motor vehicle emissions would produce a “piecemeal approach to addressing the climate
change issue.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 533 (majority opinion).
144 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012).
145 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533.
146 Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27717 (May 16, 2007).
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language (all that the Court’s decision required), but also came to the
conclusion that greenhouse gas emissions endangered public welfare.147
Although much of the real progress on climate change came after the Obama
Administration took over in 2009, there is no other way to read the evidence
than to suggest that the Bush Administration basically, and almost
immediately, accepted defeat at the hands of the Supreme Court.
B. Mach Mining v. EEOC
In a recent case involving the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and its duty to attempt conciliation before suing
employers, the Supreme Court again rebuked a presidential administration
for its approach to enforcement of statutory programs.148 At issue in the case
was the EEOC’s alleged refusal to negotiate in good faith with an employer
before formally bringing an employment discrimination suit. Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC must attempt to resolve complaints
through conciliation before proceeding to sue,149 which requires the agency
to follow an elaborate program of steps.150 However, in recent years, the Obama
Administration had come under some fire for allegedly coordinating an informal
policy not to attempt conciliation.151 In Mach Mining, the EEOC attempted to
defend its decisions not to enforce the conciliation framework by arguing that the
147 See Darren Samuelsohn & Robin Bravender, EPA Releases Bush-Era Endangerment
Document, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/10/13/13greenwire-epareleases-bush-era-endangerment-document-47439.html [https://perma.cc/2LS6-9YB6] (reporting
on a “long-sequestered document” that showed the Bush Administration had concluded in
December 2007 that greenhouse gases endangered public welfare). Even if, as some have argued, the
Bush Administration used regulatory review processes in the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs to covertly derail the climate change initiatives it was “officially” working on, see, e.g., Lisa
Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the
Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 336-38 (2014), the career staff at the EPA were
certainly empowered to lay the groundwork for progress in anticipation of a different administration.
148 See Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
149 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
150 Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1652 (“[T]he EEOC, to meet the statutory condition, must tell
the employer about the claim . . . and must provide the employer with an opportunity to discuss the
matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance.”).
151 See S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG., EEOC: AN
AGENCY ON THE WRONG TRACK? LITIGATION FAILURES, MISFOCUSED PRIORITIES, AND
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT IMPORTANT ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
AGENCY 8-9 (2014), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20EEOC%20Report%
20with%20Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/897M-BE8X] (noting a decrease in successful conciliations
and “a series of embarrassing losses” in court to highlight “questionable decisions” made by the agency);
see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION
STRATEGY DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION—A MISUSE OF AUTHORITY 18 (2014),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/EEOC%20Enforcement%20Paper%
20June%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ9X-V85J] (commenting on the EEOC’s “abusive” enforcement
tactics and calling for “adherence to its own statutory conciliation requirement”).
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APA precluded judicial review of enforcement decisions where there is no law to
apply to guide the courts.152 The Seventh Circuit agreed—breaking ranks with
several other circuits—but the Supreme Court reversed its decision.153 Justice
Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that not only was the agency’s
inaction reviewable,154 but the two letters to the defendant (one offering the
possibility of conciliation processes and another stating that the “conciliation
efforts . . . required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful”155) were
insufficient to justify the agency’s decisionmaking.156 On the first holding, the
Court hardly made a passing analysis of the government’s contention that Heckler
precluded review, and did not even have to resort to its anti-abdication
exception.157 Instead, the Court found ample “law to apply” in the guidance and
mandatory tone of the Civil Rights Act, even though the practice of conciliation
goes to the very heart of what Heckler termed “prosecutorial discretion.”158 And
while the standard of review appears to be fairly deferential, generally requiring
only a sworn affidavit from the agency saying that they attempted to conciliate,159
the Court rejected sweeping notions that there is simply no role for the courts to
play in supervising enforcement strategies at the EEOC.160
Mach Mining is more difficult to interpret than the rather dramatic
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, particularly because the standard of review
the Court adopted in Mach Mining is far from stringent and will likely be
half-heartedly applied by many lower courts. But the fact that the Court so
easily and emphatically rejected the Obama Administration’s claim that
failure to conciliate was an unreviewable form of enforcement discretion
152 See Brief for the Respondent at 35-38, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015)
(No. 13-1019).
153 Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1650-51, 1656.
154 See id. at 1652 (“Yes, the statute provides the EEOC with wide latitude over the conciliation
process, and that feature becomes significant when we turn to defining the proper scope of judicial
review. But no, Congress has not left everything to the Commission.” (citation omitted)).
155 Id. at 1650.
156 See id. at 1653 (“[T]o treat the [EEOC’s] letters as sufficient . . . is simply to accept the
EEOC’s say-so that it complied with the law. . . . [T]he point of judicial review is instead to verify
the EEOC’s say-so—that is, to determine that the EEOC actually, and not just purportedly, tried
to conciliate a discrimination charge.”).
157 Id. at 1652.
158 Id.; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (recognizing that an agency’s refusal
to institute proceedings shares the characteristics of a prosecutor’s decision not to indict).
159 See Ben James, High Court Ruling Won’t End Fights over EEOC Conciliation, LAW360 (Apr.
29, 2015, 7:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/649578/high-court-ruling-won-t-end-fights-overeeoc-conciliation [https://perma.cc/TLP6-D55D] (discussing how Mach Mining set a “low bar” for
satisfying the conciliation requirement). This would not be sufficient, however, where the defendant
furnishes independent and credible evidence that suggests that the EEOC did not in fact do so.
160 See Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1653 (“Nothing overcomes [the presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action] with respect to the EEOC’s duty to attempt conciliation of
employment discrimination claims.”).
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under Heckler is a case in point about how the Supreme Court can, and often
does, step in and effectively mark territory in cases that go to the heart of
how the executive branch operates. Moreover, just as in Massachusetts v. EPA,
it is remarkable how muted the response to this case has been from both the
President and the media. It remains to be seen whether the EEOC’s practices
will actually change in response to the decision, but it is already observable
that the President has decided not to openly criticize the Supreme Court’s
assertion of authority on this issue. Further, I am aware of no commentary
that has cast this dispute as bearing on important constitutional values of the
separation of powers. All of this is very difficult to square with accounts that
portray courts as either (a) irrelevant to or positively barred from entering
inaction disputes through the APA or (b) incapable of doing so in a way that
would not open the floodgates of litigation. Indeed, the Court seemed fully
conscious of the potential for its decision to open the floodgates, but trudged
forward nonetheless, perhaps aware that the APA’s review framework
provides ample safety valves should courts find themselves in a quagmire.
C. Texas v. United States
To a great extent, it has been the controversy over President Obama’s
executive (in)action on immigration that has inspired the recent surge in
attention to the possible constitutional limits on the President’s nonenforcement
discretion. It is also a case in point for how judges faced with unavoidable inaction
problems bear enormous pressure to channel disputes through the APA
framework (and away from Take Care Clause claims), even if they do feel there
is a role to be played by the judiciary.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed a
program—the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program—to
allow young people born in other countries but raised in the United States to
apply for “deferred action status and employment authorizations.”161 In 2014,
DHS issued a memorandum indicating that it would expand deferred action to
individuals who (1) have a son or daughter who is a lawful permanent resident,
(2) have resided in the United States continuously since before January 1, 2010,
and (3) are not an “enforcement priority.”162 This memorandum, now known as
the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) memorandum, also reserved a place for ad hoc discretion on the part of
DHS, noting that an individual could be denied an application for deferred action
if there were “other factors” that made deferred action “inappropriate.”163 A
161 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606 (S.D. Tex.), aff ’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015),
aff ’d by an equally divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
162 Id. at 611.
163 Id.

2016]

The Virtues of an APA Approach

1945

group of twenty-six states, concerned about what they saw as persistent
underenforcement of immigration laws, filed suit alleging that DHS had violated
the APA and the Take Care Clause in issuing the DAPA memorandum.164
While the district court paid homage to the well-worn principle that the
“Government’s enforcement priorities and . . . the Government’s overall
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to make,”165 it claimed that this principle did not resolve the
case because “prosecutorial discretion . . . is not the true focus of the States’
legal attack.”166 The court ultimately framed the disputed DAPA
memorandum not as inaction, but as a new action or policy (or, more
pejoratively, executive “legislation”).167 It was able to in effect avoid Heckler
by drawing a distinction between action and inaction:
While the Court recognizes (as discussed above) that the DHS possesses
considerable discretion in carrying out its duties under the [Immigration and
Nationality Act], the facts of this case do not implicate the concerns
considered by Heckler such that this Court finds itself without the ability to
review Defendants’ actions. First, the Court finds an important distinction
in two terms that are commonly used interchangeably when discussing
Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability: “non-enforcement” and “inaction.”
While agency “non-enforcement” might imply “inaction” in most
circumstances, the Court finds that, in this case, to the extent that the DAPA
Directive can be characterized as “non-enforcement,” it is actually affirmative
action rather than inaction.168

The district court doubted that Heckler “anticipated that such ‘non-enforcement’
decisions would include the affirmative act of bestowing multiple, otherwise
unobtainable benefits upon an individual.”169
The district court arguably twisted Heckler here,170 but even so, that
illustrates the point: Heckler is much more twistable than it has been widely
164
165
166
167

Id. at 607.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
See id. at 646 (“It is the contention of the States that in enacting DAPA, the DHS has not
only abandoned its duty to enforce the laws as Congress has written them, but it has also enacted
‘legislation’ contrary to the Constitution and the separation of powers therein.”).
168 Id. at 654.
169 Id. at 655-56. The opinion goes on to say that even were the presumption of unreviewability
applicable, it would be rebutted either by clear statutory commands that provide “law to apply” or
because an announced policy granting affirmative legal status would fall within the anti-abdication
exception in Heckler. Id. at 662.
170 Judge Stephen A. Higginson, writing in dissent in the Fifth Circuit panel’s affirmance of
the district court’s denial of a stay, points this out quite elegantly. See Texas v. United States, 787
F.3d 733, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion “rests
on sublimer intelligences than existing law allows”).
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portrayed to be.171 One can perhaps characterize nearly any series of decisions
that result in underenforcement of the law as either inaction or action, thereby
applying or avoiding Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability as a court
deems needed. Nothing would prevent this very same court from
characterizing another policy in a future case as a mere series of prosecutorial
decisions, or as mere guidelines for field officers. Indeed, that is what the
courts usually do. What is different about the Texas case is the importance of
the issue to larger policy debates and its potential threat to constitutional
separation-of-powers values. Ultimately, the judge in Texas was able to rely
on APA review as the basis for (a) finding the case reviewable and (b) issuing
an opinion checking the President’s assertion of power—all while avoiding a
constitutional showdown. Because all of the parties apparently conceded that
the DAPA memorandum was a “rule,” the judge simply held that the rule was
procedurally invalid because it had not gone through the APA section 553
notice-and-comment rulemaking processes.172
The appellate aftermath of the district court’s decision in Texas is
somewhat difficult to interpret, but it is largely consistent with courts’
recognition of the comparative virtues of APA review. With hardly a mention
of the Take Care Clause question,173 the Fifth Circuit upheld the preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the DAPA memorandum was “much more
than nonenforcement” and would “affirmatively confer ‘lawful presence’ and
associated benefits on a class of unlawfully present aliens.”174 Because the
memorandum was more than a policy statement or interpretive rule,175 the
court held that the states were likely to succeed on the merits of their
procedural APA claim. After the Obama Administration successfully
petitioned for certiorari,176 popular coverage of the case emphasized the
novelty and importance of the Take Care Clause question, which both lower
courts had teased but avoided.177 Yet there were early hints that the Supreme
Court would not reach the Take Care Clause issue. Overall, the briefing—
particularly that of the respondent, the State of Texas—focused on the relatively
171
172
173

See supra Section III.A.
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 671.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court,
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
174 Id. at 166.
175 Id. at 170-71, 176 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)).
176 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016) (mem.); see also Lyle Denniston, U.S. Appeals on
Immigration Policy, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/u-sappeals-on-immigration-policy/ [https://perma.cc/92J9-HUSJ] (discussing the appeal of Texas v.
United States).
177 See Peter M. Shane, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Big Immigration Case Wasn’t About Presidential
Power, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/us-v-texaswasnt-really-about-presidential-power/489047/ [https://perma.cc/F4C6-84WF].
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mundane questions of administrative law rather than unhinged constitutional
analysis.178 And the Take Care Clause did not make even a passing appearance in
oral argument before the Court.179 The Supreme Court’s one-sentence per
curiam opinion affirming the judgment by an equally divided court180 may give
the appearance that the Take Care Clause issue is still alive, but it bears
mentioning that no court to have considered the issue has yet given any indication
of doing more than mentioning the underlying constitutional concerns.181 There
is no reason to think that will change on remand to the district court, and by the
time the case returns to the Supreme Court (if it does), the high political
controversy over immigration and executive power may well have passed.
None of this should be surprising. Once courts have found Heckler
inapplicable or have rebutted the presumption of unreviewability in some
way, they can ultimately stop presidential inaction in its tracks by using the
full panoply of administrative law protections rather than by questioning the
constitutional merits of the inaction. This ability to draw on seemingly minor
procedural deficiencies to stop agency inaction is a powerful tool and gives
the courts substantial leverage, particularly because it is difficult for
Presidents to argue against such procedural deficiencies in court. The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion upholding the preliminary injunction reveals much about
the covert power of the APA approach: the court noted that “DAPA was
enjoined because the states seek an opportunity to be heard through notice
and comment, not to have the judiciary formulate or rewrite immigration
policy.”182 But that is precisely what the courts have done (for better or
worse), and it is difficult to see how they could have done it any other way.
D. Discussion
These three cases are not intended to definitively answer the question of
whether courts can successfully marshal the tools available to them under the
APA to police purposive presidential inaction. Because the cases focus on
instances where the courts limited the asserted executive authority to
underenforce the law, they can say nothing about how often courts use the
safety valves identified in Section III.B, nor anything about how much
institutional capacity and capital is reaped when courts exercise the passive
virtues. But this much is clear: they show the fruits of that aggregate behavior by
revealing unexpected, often subtle, exercises of judicial power. In other words,
178
179
180
181
182

Brief in Opposition, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
Shane, supra note 177.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 169-70 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court,
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
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they are sufficient to suggest that the courts derive actual authority in this domain
of cases, especially in high-profile cases where executive overreach is most
obvious and where other approaches to the problem seem the most intractable.
Perhaps the best illustration of exactly what the APA framework does for
the courts in this interbranch terrain comes in a thought experiment involving
any of these cases. Would it even be imaginable that the Court could have
addressed the Bush Administration’s inaction on climate change using
separation-of-powers principles alone? Can we even fathom the level of
hostility and pushback that would have occurred were a district court in Texas
to rest its decision on the Take Care Clause claims in Texas v. United States?
How would this kind of review actually play out, in terms of both legal
formalities and constitutional politics?
The complexity and uncertainty surrounding the administrative law of
agency inaction insulates the courts and softens the edge of the knife without
entirely sacrificing a role for the judiciary. It is a tool that will probably not
fully satisfy formalist critics of the practice of presidential inaction, but one
that should be recognized by functionalist scholars.
CONCLUSION
I have started with the premise that there are legitimate reasons to be
worried about the constitutional and rule-of-law implications of purposive
presidential inaction. I have argued that, rather than abdicating entirely,
courts can and do use the administrative law of agency inaction to translate
constitutional separation-of-powers concerns into a doctrinal framework that
poses fewer threats to the capacity of courts and is more effective when courts
do decide to intervene. Knowing that courts can and in fact do intervene
should appease both formalist and functionalist critics of purposive
presidential inaction, and perhaps it will obviate the need to develop
unproven political process controls on the exercise of executive discretion.
There is nothing wrong with the aspirational constitutional debate taking
place around the Take Care Clause. Indeed, that debate will likely continue to
inform the development of APA review of agency inaction. Sometimes, though,
the simplest and best solution is the one you already know and use. Certainly the
federal courts, which are focused on persuasively resolving disputes and
preserving their own institutional vitality and prestige, will continue along the
APA path as long as they can before diving into the constitutional thicket.

